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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Briefs of Appellant and Appellee have been filed in this Court. Pursuant to 
Rules 24 and 26, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant ("Bello") files this Reply 
Brief in response to the Appellee's Brief, which contains inaccurate facts. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The facts in the instant case have been previously addressed by Bello in his opening 
brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BELLO CHALLENGES THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS BELOW 
AND IN THIS COURT; THUS, THE ISSUE OF ADEQUACY OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS IS PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW. 
After chronicling the district court's factual findings, the State contends: "Based on 
the above findings of fact, which defendant does not contest, the court denied defendant's 
- 2 -
motion to suppress." Br. of Appellee at 5. To the extent the State asserts that Bello did 
not contest the district court's findings either below or in this Court, the assertion is clearly 
not supported by the record. First, Bello filed a motion to reconsider, urging the district 
court to augment its findings and conclusions because they are inadequate and erroneous. 
See R. 102, 126. In addition, considerable portion of Bello's Brief to this Court was 
devoted to contesting the district court's findings and conclusions. See, e.g., Br. of 
Appellant at 9-13. Thus, contrary to the State's assertion, it is clear that Bello challenges 
the district court findings and preserves the question of adequacy of those findings for 
appellate review. 
POINT II 
BELLO DID NOT WAIVE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM THAT THE 
SEARCH VIOLATED ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
The State argues that Bello fails to advocate why the search and seizure of his 
vehicle independently violated article 1, section 14, of the Utah Constitution. Br. of 
Appellee at 7. Consequently, the State contends that "defendant's constitutional claims 
should be deemed waived." Id. at 8. 
As the State acknowledged, however, Bello "assertfed below] that the search of his 
truck failed to meet state constitutional requirements for warrantless vehicle searches set 
forth in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 467-68 (Utah 1990) (plurality)." Br. of Appellee at 
- 3 -
8. Consequently, this is not a case "where a defendant fails to assert a particular ground 
for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court," State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 
656, 660 (Utah 1985), or where an appellant attempts to raise a constitutional issue for the 
first time on appeal, see State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Indeed, Bello articulated to the district court that the warrantless search of his truck 
violated the state constitution as set forth in Larocco. See Memorandum In Support of 
Motion to Suppress, R. 27, at 14-16 (attached to this Reply Brief as Addendum IV). 
Further, when the State and the district court failed to respond or consider his state 
constitutional argument, Bello moved the district court to reconsider its sketchy findings 
and conclusions in light of his Laracco-based state constitutional argument and other then 
recently decided cases. See Memorandum In Support of Motion to Reconsider, R. 126, at 
5-6 (attached to this Reply Brief as Addendum V). 
The State, in arguing that Bello does not advocate why article 1, section 14, should 
be read differently from the fourth amendment, clearly ignores Larocco and the principle 
of stare decisis. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). Precluding the 
kind of revanchist argument forwarded by the State in this case, the Larocco court held: 
The time has come for this court, in applying an automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to try to 
simplify, if possible, the search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily 
followed by the police and the courts and, at the same time, provide the public with 
consistent and predictable protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
This can be accomplished by eliminating some of the confusing exceptions to the 
warrant requirement that have been developed by federal law in recent years. . . . 
- 4 -
Specifically, this court will continue to use the concept of expectation of privacy as 
a suitable threshold criterion for determining whether article I, section is applicable. 
Then if article I, section 14 applies, warrantless searches will be permitted only if 
they satisfy their traditional justification, namely to protect the safety of police or 
the public or to protect the destruction of evidence. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70. If stare decisis has any meaning, it is for the proposition that 
"the outcome of an appeal presenting a particular legal question [s]hould be dependent 
more on . . . whether the issue has been previously addressed and decided by [a higher] 
court." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1269. The question whether article 1, section 14, provides 
broader protection than the Fourth Amendment has been addressed and decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469. Thus, it is clear that the State engages 
in circular reasoning and callously disregards stare decisis by claiming that the "trial court 
upheld the warrantless vehicle search based on defendant's voluntary search [sic] consent 
and thus declined to consider defendant's Larocco argument." Br. of Appellee at 8. As the 
Larocco decision makes clear, the trial court may not ignore the pivotal question under 
article 1, section 14, namely, whether there were exigent circumstances precluding the 
officer from obtaining a warrant to search a vehicle. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70. 
In addition, in his Brief to this Court, Bello not only asserts that article 1, section 
14's unique history compels a different result than the fourth amendment. He also 
suggested how and why, under our federal system of government, the state constitutional 
- 5 -
provision should be read differently than the fourth amendment.1 Bello then urged this 
Court to look to the Larocco decision for guidance in defining the scope of article 1, 
section 14 relative to warrantless vehicle searches. In short, the format employed by Bello 
in his appellate brief mirrored that suggested by the Utah Supreme Court and a panel of 
this Court. See generally State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) (referring to scholar 
and cases that have employed similar analytical techniques in state constitutional advocacy); 
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (providing framework for state 
constitutional advocacy). 
CONCLUSION 
Bello urges this Court to consider his argument that article 1, section 14, of the Utah 
Constitution independently mandate that the warrantless vehicle search conducted in this 
case should have been suppressed by the district court 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 1993. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
1
 Bello need not have made these arguments because the Larocco decision clearly 
departed from federal law and signifies the independence of article 1, section 14 from the 
fourth amendment. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Reply Brief of Appellant, this day of July, 1993, to Janet C. Graham, Utah Attorney 
General, Marian Decker, Assistant Attorney General, 235 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84114. 
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RONALD J. YENGICH #3580 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East Fourth South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
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IN THE SIXTH COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SEVIER COUNTY, 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES RONALD BELLO, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Case No. 
qi-frpri 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On March 5thf 1991, at approximately 11:15 a.m., 
Trooper Phil Barney observed defendant's eastbound pickup truck 
temporarily straddling the lane marker dividing the inside and 
outside eastbound lanes of traffic. He followed the truck for 
approximately two miles, during which time he observed no other 
unusual driving pattern. At that time, the trooper decided to 
pull the truck over even though he acknowledged that the extreme 
wind conditions present that day could have been the reason for 
the temporary straddling of the lanes. However, he indicated that 
he just wanted to check it out. 
Trooper Barney then approached the truck, which had 
California plates, and demanded a driver's license and 
registration, both of which defendant produced. When the trooper 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence 
State v. Bellor Case No. 911000154 FS 
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noted that the truck was registered to someone other than 
defendant, defendant explained that the owner of the truck was 
his boss in California. It was apparently at about this point 
that the trooper started getting "faint whiffs" of marijuana. He 
also observed that defendant appeared to be nervous and shaky. 
The trooper started writing a citation for weaving but 
became convinced that the truck contained marijuana. It was at 
this point that the trooper decided that he clearly was not going 
to let defendant leave the scene without first conducting a 
search of the truck. He then began asking for consent to search 
although the video tape made clear the fact that the officer was 
going to search and that defendant was in custody. 
Ultimately, the trooper discovered a large amount of 
marijuana in the underside of the pickup bed. Defendant was 
arrested and charged with Possession of Marijuana, a second 
degree felony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL TRAFFIC STOP WAS UNREASONABLE 
AND A PRETEXT FOR AN INVESTIGATION INTO 
MATTERS UNRELATED TO THE STOP. 
2 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Sierra, has 
concluded that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
This fact was clearly demonstrated by the video tape that was 
made with relation to this stop. 
2
 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988). 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence 
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States Constitution prohibit the State from employing an 
unreasonable or pretextual traffic stop as a means for 
investigating occupants of an automobile. Thusf Trooper Barney1s 
stop of the truck can be constitutionally justified on one of two 
alternative grounds: First, it could be based on specific, 
articulable facts, which together with rational inferences drawn 
from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. Second, 
the stop could be incident to a lawful citation for straddling 
the lanes. 
Anything less would invite intrusions upon 
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on 
nothing more substantial than inarticulate 
hunches, a result the United States Supreme 
Court has consistently refused to sanction. 
A. 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
For a motor vehicle stop to comply with 
constitutionally required reasonable suspicion, the "trial courts 
are required to consider the totality of the circumstances 
5 
confronting the officer at the time of the seizure." 
In
 Sierra, the court found that a traffic stop to cite 
the defendant for following too close was unreasonable and a 
pretext for a further investigation. The court based this 
3
 See also State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989). 
4
 Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975. 
5
 id., at 975. 
<u 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence 
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decision on two circumstances surrounding the stop of the 
defendant. The first involved the officer's misapplication of 
the statute that prohibited a vehicle from driving in the left 
lane on the freeway. The officer who made the stop told the 
driver that he was obligated to pull to the right immediately 
after passing another vehicle. The statute relied upon by the 
officer in fact required that a driver move to the right lane as 
soon as practical. Based on the officer's misinterpretation of 
the statute and the lack of a complete record on the driving 
pattern, the court was unable to conclude that the defendant had 
7 
in fact violated the law. 
Even more important to the court was the officer's 
actions preceding the stop for the traffic violation. The court 
found that the officer was suspicious of the defendant before he 
observed any traffic violation. The officer, prior to making the 
stop, had called for a check on the vehicle's license plate to 
determine if the vehicle was stolen. Backup assistance had been 
called for before the stop, and the officer had to exceed the 
speed limit in order to catch up with the defendant. 
After reviewing the facts under the totality of the 
circumstances, the court concluded that defendant's nervousness 
was not inconsistent with innocent behavior and that the 
officer's decision to stop his car "was based on nothing more 
See id. 
7
 See id. at 979. 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence 
State v. Bellof Case No. 911000154 FS 
Page 5 
than an unconstitutional hunch" that defendant was carrying 
o 
narcotics. 
In the instant case, Trooper Barney stopped the truck 
allegedly for temporarily straddling the lanes. Hef however, 
acknowledged that the extreme canyon winds could have been 
responsible for the straddling. Defendant submits that the 
trooper had no reason whatsoever to stop him after following the 
truck for approximately two miles without observing any 
straddling or unusual driving pattern. 
The only reported explanation for the trooper's 
questioning of defendant from this point on was the fact that the 
truck had California license plates and its occupant appeared 
9 
nervous. Thus, without having a legitimate reason for being 
there at that point, the trooper proceeded to question and then 
search. The trooper's failure to allow defendant to proceed was 
clearly to further investigate him for possible crimes unrelated 
to the initial stop. Moreover, it is important to point out that 
the trooper did not once question the defendant regarding the 
temporary straddling, his purported concern for initially 
Ld. at 976. See also State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1987)(Mexican appearance, out of state license plates and 
nervousness do not constitute reasonable suspicion); United 
States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985)(Spanish 
appearance, out of state license plates and sole concern that 
defendant was transporting narcotics does not justify a Terry 
stop). 
9 
The video tape of Mr. Bello does not confirm this observation 
of the officer. 
3/ 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence 
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stopping the truck. Rather, like the officer in Sierrar the 
trooper requested a backup and subsequently checked defendant's 
criminal records and conducted a search of the truck. It is clear 
that the stop at this point had become a pretext for something 
else.10 
In State v. Baird, the Court of Appeals was faced 
with facts quite similar to those in the instant case. In Baird, 
a highway patrolman was parked in a median on Interstate 15 near 
Moab, for the purpose of checking the speed of passing cars with 
a radar unit. As he sat in his vehicle the patrolman observed a 
late model cadillac approaching at 56 miles per hour. The car had 
Arizona license plates that somehow did not appear to the officer 
to be valid. The patrolman was unaware of Arizona's color scheme 
for determining sticker validity. 
Nevertheless, the officer followed the car and then 
stopped it purportedly to check out the sticker's validity. As he 
approached the vehicle, the officer, among other things, 
detected the odor of marijuana. After discovering through 
dispatch that the driver had a suspended driver's license, the 
officer arrested him and had the car towed to Nephi and searched 
u
 Compare the instant case with State v, Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 
(Utah Ct.App. 1990) (stop of defendant's vehicle for 
malfunctioning turn signal was a pretext). 
1 1
 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence 
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without the owner's consent. The search resulted in the discovery 
of 165 pounds of marijuana in the trunk. 
The court accorded no weight to the officer's detection 
of odor of marijuana after finding the initial stop pretextual. 
It went on to find that: 
[t]he officer articulated "something just 
struck me funny about if referring to the 
license plate sticker. Alone this does not 
approach reasonable and articulable 
suspicion. The state attempted to justify the 
stop by the after-discovered evidence...While 
this may have justified a further inquiry of 
the driver after a valid stop, such 
articulable suspicion must be present at the 
time of the stop. 
In the instant case, once the trooper observed no 
unusual driving pattern, he had no reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the driver of the truck was engaged in or about to 
engage in criminal activity. Therefore, his approach to the 
driver's window and demand for identification was unlawful. 
Further, unlike the officer in Baird, the trooper did not 
discover any incriminating evidence pursuant to the NCIC check. 
Defendant's license was valid and the truck had not been 
reported stolen. Moreover, defendant's apparent nervousness and 
the fact that the trooper detected the odor of marijuana are not 
13 
enough to justify further inquiry. Based on the foregoing, 
Id. at 1216-17 (emphasis added and footnote ommitted). 
13 
See id.: see generally Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1137 
(nervousness not ground to support reasonable suspicion); 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 184 (same); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 976 (same). 
2' 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence 
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defendant submits that all evidence seized from the unlawful 
search and seizure should be suppressed. 
B. 
STOP INCIDENT TO TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
A police officer may constitutionally stop a vehicle 
14 for a traffic violation committed in his or her presence. The 
officer may not, however, use a misdemeanor violation as a 
springboard for launching a full scale search of such vehicle 
15 
without probable cause. 
A trial court determines whether a stop for a traffic 
violation and the subsequent search of a vehicle and its occupant 
were pretextual by looking objectively at the officer's action 
under the totality of the circumstances. In the instant case, the 
test is whether a reasonable officer, under the totality of the 
circumstances, would have stopped the truck for temporarily 
straddling the lanes, even after the hypothetical officer had 
observed no straddling or any unusual driving pattern for two 
miles and had acknowledged that the temporary straddling could 
have been caused by powerful canyon winds. Defendant submits 
that this inquiry must be answered in the negative. This is so 
because the trooper had no reason not to allow defendant to 
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1984). 
1 5
 Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977; State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
1 6
 See Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence 
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proceed at the point when he observed no citable traffic 
violation. 
In Arroyo, the court emphasized the arresting officer's 
investigative actions preceding the traffic stop in finding a 
pretext stop. The defendant was driving on Interstate 15 and was 
stopped by an off duty highway patrol trooper. The defendant was 
observed traveling at approximately fifty miles per hour 
following another vehicle at a distance of three to eight car 
lengths. The trooper, who was traveling in the opposite direction 
of the defendant's vehicle, had to make a U-turn through the 
freeway median. He did not immediately stop the defendant, but 
pulled alongside him and noticed that the defendant was Hispanic 
and the vehicle had out of state license plates. The trooper then 
pulled back and stopped the defendant. The purpose of the stop 
was to cite the defendant for following another vehicle too 
closely. The court noted that very few citations are issued for 
that offense. The court concluded its analysis of the pretext 
issue, stating: 
We are persuaded that a reasonable officer 
would not have stopped Arroyo and cited him 
for 'following too closely' except for some 
unarticulated suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity. 
Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155; see also Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979 ("We 
are persuaded that a reasonable officer would not have stopped 
Sierra's car and issued a warning citation for travelling in the 
left lane but for his desire to [conduct further criminal 
investigation]."). 
? c 
Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence 
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The facts and circumstances in the instant case 
indicate that Trooper Barney's motivation for stopping the truck 
was investigatory. Even if his initial reason for wanting to stop 
the truck was legitimate, his intention to search for evidence of 
crimes became obvious when he continued on despite his 
observation, for two miles, of no unusual driving pattern. 
Although the trooper purportedly stopped the truck for 
straddling or weaving, he never checked to find out the reason 
for the straddling, apparently because he knew the winds were 
primarily responsible. Thus, his actions were more unreasonable 
than the officers' actions in Arroyo, Sierra, and Mendoza, which 
the court found impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. While 
the officer therein could justify stopping the defendants 
initially for "following too closely," or "for staying in 
lefthand lanes," such justification was unavailable to the 
trooper herein, because most reasonable officers do not stop 
drivers for temporarily straddling lanes, particularly under 
18 
extreme canyon winds as in the instant case, and where there is 
another reasonable explanation for the driving pattern. 
Defendant therefore submits that a reasonable officer 
would not have stopped and questioned him for straddling. The 
actions of the trooper clearly demonstrate a pretextual traffic 
stop and/or detention to conduct a further investigation for 
1 8
 See, e.g.. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 
1986)(stop of defendant's car for weaving was pretext to conduct 
warrantless search). 
Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence 
State v. Bello, Case No. 911000154 FS 
Page 11 
evidence of possible crimes. Even if the trooper had reasonable 
grounds for initially stopping the truck, the reasonableness of 
the stop would have ended when defendant produced a valid 
registration and license. Moreover, all of the trooper's actions 
were consistent with an investigative motive. The stop of the 
truck was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The 
fact that the trooper subsequently detected the odor of marijuana 
19 does not validate the pretextual stop. Therefore, defendant 
requests this court to suppress the evidence seized as a result 
of the stop and subsequent searches. 
POINT II 
THE SEARCH CONDUCTED BY THE TROOPER EXCEEDED 
THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S CONSENT. 
"Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a 
search, the ensuing search must be limited in scope to only the 
20 
specific area agreed to by defendant." In the instant case, 
defendant consented to the search of the cabin portion of the 
truck. Having found nothing therein, the trooper ordered 
defendant to open up the truck bed and proceeded to conduct a 
full scale search. Defendant submits that the search 
"transcendted] the actual scope of the consent given [and] 
21 
encroaches on [his] Fourth Amendment rights." 
See supra text accompanying note 11; Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. 
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
United States v. Gary. 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985). 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT WAS INVALID BECAUSE IT 
WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED FROM THE 
ILLEGAL STOP. 
The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that a consent 
search made following illegal police conduct can be 
constitutionally valid only if it is non-coerced and not arrived 
22 
at by exploitation of the primary police illegality. Assuming 
that defendant's consent in the instant case was non-coerced, 
evidence seized from him must nevertheless be suppressed because 
23 
the consent was the fruit of an illegal stop. 
To determine whether consent was obtained as a result 
of an exploitation of prior police illegality, the Supreme Court 
has counselled trial courts to examine several factors, including 
the temporal proximity of the illegality and the consent, the 
presence of intervening circumstances, the flagrancy of the 
24 illegality, and whether defendant was Mirandized. 
TEMPORAL PROXIMITY OF STOP AND CONSENT 
Defendant's consent occurred immediately after Trooper 
Barney pretextually stopped him for weaving. In Sims, where, as 
here, the trooper obtained a consent "in a very short time span" 
" See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689-91 (Utah 1990); State 
v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv.Rep. 8, 13 (Ct.App. 1991). 
23 
See sources cited supra note 21; State v. Carter, 156 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 17, 21 (Ct.App. 1991). 
See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 and n. 4; see also Sims, 156 
Utah Adv.Rep. at 13-14. 
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or "within minutes" after an illegal roadblock, the court 
concluded that there was not "enough time to attenuate the 
25 
relationship between the two." 
INTERVENING CIRCUMSTANCES 
As in Sims, defendant's consent "arose from an unbroken 
26 
chain of events that began with the illegal [stop]." The 
trooper stopped defendant, asked him for his license and 
registration, detected an odor of marijuana, and asked for 
consent. "Nothing occurred which could have reasonably made 
[defendant] feel free to proceed on his journey at any time 
between the moment of the stop and the discoveries that prompted 
27 the trooper's request for consent to search [the truck]." 
FLAGRANCY OF THE ILLEGALITY 
Defendant submits that the stop in the instant case was 
an unconstitutional stop and not one conducted to serve good 
28 purposes. As earlier argued, Trooper Barney stopped defendant 
solely to conduct investigations unrelated to traffic violation. 
25 
Sims. Utah Adv.Rep. at 14 (footnote ommitted); see also Brown 
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (interval of two hours 
insufficient to attenuate prior police misconduct). 
26 
Sims, at 14. 
27 
Id.: see also Carter, 156 Utah Adv.Rep. at 17 (no intervening 
circumstances between illegal detention and consent). 
28 
In Sims, the Court of Appeals cautioned police officers 
against employing limitless zeal in the effort to thwart illegal 
drug trafficking. That an officer has a "Max 25" nose for 
detecting narcotics does not justify a pretextual stop based on a 
claim, as here, that the driver straddled the lanes. See Sims, 
156 Utah Adv.Rep. 8, n. 1. 
Z4 
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He had no articulable reason for not allowing defendant to 
proceed on his journey after observing no unusual driving pattern 
and after defendant had produced a valid license. Thusf the 
trooper's conduct was flagrant and indefensible. 
MIRANDA WARNING 
It is undisputed that the trooper Mirandized defendant 
in the instant case ex post facto. The trooper had already 
obtained defendant's consent and conducted a thorough search of 
the truck before giving him Miranda warnings. 
Based on the foregoing, this court should suppress the 
evidence seized from defendant because the searches which exposed 
the marijuana, even if consensual, were not sufficiently 
attenuated to be purged of the prior illegal stop made by the 
trooper. 
POINT IV 
THE WARRANTLESS AUTOMOBILE SEARCH CONDUCTED 
BY TROOPER BARNEY IS PER SE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT LACKED 
REASONABLE SUSPICION AND THERE WAS NO 
EMERGENCY PREVENTING THE TROOPER FROM 
OBTAINING A WARRANT. 
In State v. Larocco, the Utah Supreme Court departed 
from confusing Federal automobile search and seizure case law. 
The Court concluded that warrantless automobile searches are per 
se unconstitutional unless the police have probable cause to 
believe that the automobile contained contraband and exigent 
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). 
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circumstances require that the automobile be searched before a 
30 
warrant can be obtained. 
In the instant case, defendant has demonstrated that 
the trooper lacked probable cause to stop him. The Utah 
legislature does not authorize indiscriminate stop of individuals 
and motor vehicles within the State. A citizen or vehicle can be 
. . 31 briefly stopped only if the officer has reasonable suspicion. 
Under the facts here, mere hunch that defendant possessed 
marijuana in the truck is insufficient to satisfy the required 
32 probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The officer did not 
observe any unusual driving pattern as to have the requisite 
suspicion. 
Furthermore, there was no exigent circumstance under 
the facts of the instant case. The officer could have obtained a 
warrant to search the truck after he detected the odor of 
marijuana. In fact, the officer could have obtained a telephonic 
warrant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-23-4(2)(1953, as 
amended). Rather than obtaining a warrant, the trooper conducted 
a full scale search of the truck, thereby usurping the 
magistrate's traditional function of determining whether probable 
See id. at 470. 
3 1
 See Sims, 156 Utah Adv.Rep. at 12. Coles, 674 P.2d at 199 
(police may stop a vehicle only for traffic violation committed 
in their presence). 
32 
See text accompanying supra note 8. 
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33 
cause to search existed. 
Because defendant's truck was searched without consent 
and the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion and was not 
confronted with any exigencies, the evidence seized pursuant to 
the search must be suppressed as violative of Article If Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The stop of defendant's truck for weaving was a pretext 
to conduct investigation unrelated to the alleged traffic 
violation. Therefore, evidence seized from him must be suppressed 
pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because there 
was insufficient attenuation between the stop and the consent to 
purge the taint of the prior illegality. 
Furthermore, Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution compels suppression of the evidence seized from 
defendant because the warrantless searches were conducted without 
reasonable suspicion and there were no exigent circumstances to 
justify an exception to the warrant requirement. 
DATED this *^l day o£Jteywl991. 
RONAI 
Attorney for Defendant 
33 
See Sims, at 12. ("In the usual non-exigent circumstances 
search and seizure scenario, the judicial branch, through a 
magistrate, serves as the neutral authority that issues or denies 
a warrant to perform a search and seizure.") 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress 
Evidence was mailed/delivered to R. Don Brown, Sevier County 
Attorney, at the Sevier County Courthouse, Richfield, Utah, 
84701, this 2 - ^ day of May, 1991. 
It 
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RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East 400 South 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
JAMES RONALD BELLO, | 
Defendant. ] 
| MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF | MOTION TO RECONSIDER | DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S | MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 911000154 FS 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
Defendant James Ronald Bello, by and through his attorney 
of record, Ronald J. Yengich, hereby submits the following 
memorandum in support of his motion to reconsider the denial of his 
Motion to Suppress. 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 23, 1991, this Court issued its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law denying defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Subsequent to this Court's decision, the Utah Court of Appeals, on 
January 30, 1992, decided the case of State v. Godina-Luna, 179 
Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Ct. App. 1992). In Godina-Luna, which involved 
facts similar to those in the instant case, the court affirmed the 
lower court decision granting the defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence. In light of Godina-Luna and the following argument, 
defendant believes this Court should reconsider its decision of 
September 23, 1991. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS IN LIGHT OF STATE v. GODINA-LUNA. 
A. State v. Godina-Luna 
In Godina-Luna, the officer observed the defendant's car 
weaving in and out of traffic lanes. Suspecting the driver might 
be intoxicated, the officer pulled the vehicle over. After 
stopping the vehicle, he concluded that the defendants, the driver 
and passenger, were not in fact intoxicated. However, because the 
defendants were nervous, the officer demanded their identification, 
which they promptly produced. He then conducted an NCIC check, 
which turned out negative. Thereafter, he asked the defendants if 
they had firearms or narcotics in the vehicle. One defendant 
answered "No, [but] if you'd like to check, go ahead.'1 The ensuing 
search revealed four kilograms of cocaine. 
The defendants then moved to suppress the evidence, 
alleging that the stop was pretextual and that the consent was 
invalid because it was obtained in exploitation of the illegal 
- 2 -
stop. The trial court found the stop legitimate, but concluded 
that the officer exceeded the scope of his authority after 
discovering that the defendants were not intoxicated. 
On appeal the issue was (1) whether the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to further detain and question the defendants 
after discovering they were in fact sober, and (2) whether the 
consent was involuntary and tainted by the illegal detention. The 
Court of Appeals held that M[o]nce the reasons for the initial stop 
have been satisfied, the individual must be allowed to proceed on 
his or her way." Godina-Luna, 179 UAR at 23. Any further 
detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion. That the 
defendants were nervous or took a less than direct route to their 
destination did not justify further detention, the court concluded. 
"Although the deputy's hunch ultimately proved to be correct, a 
hunch, without more, does not raise a reasonable articulable 
suspicion regardless of the final result." Id. 
The court then went on to find that the consent to search 
was a product of prior illegality and therefore invalid under the 
authority of State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). See 
Godina v. Luna, 179 UAR at 23. 
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B. This Court's Conclusions of Law is 
Inadequate in Light of Godina-Luna 
1. The instant case is very similar to Godina-Luna.1 
Once Trooper Barney had verified defendant's identification and had 
determined that he was sober and that the weaving was caused by 
high canyon winds, he had no reason to further detain and question 
defendant. Thus, this Court should reconsider its legal conclusion 
and hold that even if the initial stop was valid, there was no 
justification for further detaining defendant. 
2. In addition, the Court should reconsider its legal 
conclusion, at page 3, that "[t]he defendant voluntarily consented 
to the search and there is no evidence of coercion." That consent 
was voluntarily given and obtained without coercion does not 
conclusively establish its constitutionality. "The State must show 
the consent was (1) voluntary and (2) not obtained by exploitation 
of prior illegality." Godina-Luna, 179 UAR at 23. 
Defendant argued at length in his suppression memorandum 
that his so-called consent was obtained in exploitation of the 
prior illegal stop and detention. Neither the state nor this Court 
specifically address that issue. In light of Godina-Luna and other 
1
 However, unlike the defendants in Godina-Luna, defendant here 
continues to maintain that the initial stop of his vehicle was 
pretextual. 
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cases cited by defendant, this Court should re-evaluate its 
conclusion and determine whether defendant's consent was a fruit of 
prior police misconduct. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW SIMILARLY OVERLOOKED STATE 
v. LAROCCO'S HOLDING THAT THE STATE CONSTITUTION 
INDEPENDENTLY REQUIRE THAT A VEHICLE SEARCH MUST BE 
PRECEDED BOTH BY REASONABLE SUSPICION AND EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Defendant contended that the search of his vehicle 
violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution in that it 
lacked probable cause and exigent circumstances, as required by 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). The State has 
callously disregarded defendant's argument. This Court similarly 
has made no factual finding or legal conclusion regarding that 
particular issue. Because " [t]he constitutionality of a police 
officer's detention and search of an individual's automobile turns 
on . . . specific[s]," the findings of fact and legal conclusion 
must address all relevant issues. See Godina-Luna, 179 UAR at 22. 
Defendant therefore urges this Court to reconsider its decision and 
make a complete findings of fact and conclusions of law.2 
2
 Defendant also requests the Court to reconsider its conclusion 
that United States v. Bostick, 49 Cr. L. 2270 (S. Ct. 1991), 
somehow authorizes law enforcement officers to rampantly detain 
citizens, question them and obtain consent to search. The Supreme 
Court recently denied certiorari in a case originating from Utah, 
- 5 -
ir^t 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant urges this Court to reconsider its order 
denying his motion to suppress in light of the recent case of 
Godina-Luna.3 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S-O day of February, 1992. 
RONALD J. YENGIC 
Attorney for Def^ndan 
United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991), on 
rehearing, 941 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1991). In Walker, the Tenth 
Circuit clearly rejected the argument that appellate courts have 
"consistently recognized the appropriateness of a request to search 
made by a police officer during a valid traffic stop, without a 
requirement of independent justification for the request." 933 
F.2d at 816. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has 
allowed the police in "certain limited circumstances" to stop 
motorists and ask questions without any individualized suspicion of 
criminality. See, e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) 
(the roadblock case). It concluded, however, that the police may 
not stop a motorist for a traffic violation and then question him 
or her and obtain consent to search, unless the government can show 
that the police have no unfettered discretion "to detain some 
individuals and to let others go. . . ." Walker, 941 F.2d at 1087-
89. 
The instant case, which is factually similar to Godina-Luna 
and Walker,, did not involve a roadblock conducted pursuant to State 
law. Thus, it was constitutionally impermissible for Trooper 
Barney to detain defendant, question him and obtain consent to 
search, absent a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. This 
Court's application of the Bostick case to the instant case is, 
therefore, erroneous and merited reconsideration. 
Also attached is the District Court opinion in United States 
of America v. Beltran, U.S.D.Ct. 91 CR-249 J. 
- 6 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Denial 
of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid, this 2Lft day 
of February, 1992, to R. Don Brown, Sevier County Attorney, at 250 
North Main, Richfield, Utah, 84701. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JESUS BELTRAN AND ARTURO 
BELTRAN, 
Defendants. 
| ' - » . . - . _ . 
i MEMORANDUM OPINION 
I AND ORDER 
i Case No. 91-CR-249J 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Court heard evidence and argument on defendants' Motion to 
Suppress on January 24, 1992. In their Memorandum in Support of 
the Motion to Suppress and at the evidentiary hearing, defendants 
contended that the Court should suppress all the evidence seized 
from the November 20, 1991, search of the defendants' rented U-Haul 
truck, basing their contention on four main arguments. First, 
defendants assert that the continued detention of the defendants' 
by Trooper Curtis Dean Shields ("Shields11) for purposes of having 
defendants appear before the magistrate in Richfield was 
pretextual. Second, defendants argue that when Shields called 
ahead to have a ••sniffer dog" ready to conduct a search of 
defendants' vehicle, he detained the Beltrans longer than necessary 
without probable cause in direct violation of United States v. 
Walker. 751 F. Supp. 199 (D. Utah, C D . 1990), vacated and 
remanded. 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991), reh'a denied. 941 F.2d 
1086 (10th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 
(10th Cir. 1988). Third, defendants claim that the consent to 
search the truck, given by defendant Jesus Beltran, was the product 
of an illegal detention and therefore, under the totality of the 
circumstances, was neither informed nor voluntary. Finally, 
defendants argue that even if the consent was valid, entering the 
truck with a "sniffer dog" exceeded the scope of the consent. 
After careful consideration of the evidence, memoranda, argument of 
counsel, and applicable law and for the reasons set forth below, 
the court hereby GRANTS defendants' Motion To Suppress and ORDERS 
that all the evidence seized from the November 20, 1991 search of 
the defendants Jesus and Arturo Beltrans' truck is suppressed and, 
therefore, inadmissible at trial. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On the morning of November 20, 1991, Shields was travelling 
East on Interstate 70 in Sevier County, Utah.1 At approximately 
7:25 a.m. Shields noticed a U-Haul truck traveling east on 1-70. 
The vehicle passed him, pulled in front of him and then reduced in 
speed. After following the vehicle for a considerable distance, 
Shields testified that the vehicle began weaving. Shields further 
testified that the driving pattern caused him to believe that the 
driver of the truck was either drowsy or otherwise impaired. 
After observing the motion of the truck, Shields called the 
dispatcher to determine whether the U-Haul's license plates were 
!Unless otherwise indicated, all facts are taken from the 
transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Suppress. Because the 
trial to which this matter related was scheduled to take place ten 
days after the motion was heard, the Court did not have time to 
obtain a certified transcript. All factual references, therefore, 
must be cited to the transcript generally. 
2 
"wanted." While waiting for a response, Shields continued to 
follow the truck and continued to observe the driving pattern. 
After receiving information from the dispatcher that the truck's 
license plates were not "wanted," Shields pulled the U-Haul over. 
Shields, through questioning the occupants of the vehicle, and 
using his computer, determined that (1) The driver (Arturo) did not 
have a driver's license; (2) The passenger (Jesus) has a valid 
Colorado driver's license and a valid U- Haul rental contract made 
out to him; (3) Neither defendant was listed as "wanted" by NCIC; 
and (4) The occupants stated they were hauling a load of used 
furniture from Los Angeles to Denver. 
Shields then questioned Jesus and Arturo separately while 
writing them separate citations for violations. Shields cited 
Arturo for driving without a license and gave a warning for 
improper lane travel. Additionally, Shields cited Jesus for 
allowing an unlicensed driver to operate a vehicle. Both citations 
were issued at 7:40 a.m. After issuing the citations, Shields kept 
Jesus' license and the rental agreement, and instructed the 
Beltran's to follow him to the Magistrate in Richfield, Utah, where 
they could post a bond to insure their appearance. While enroute, 
Shields called ahead to arrange for a canine "drug-sniff" team to 
meet him at the courthouse where he hoped to get consent to search 
the U-Haul. 
After both defendants had paid their fines and were proceeding 
from the courthouse to the parking lot, Shields asked Jesus if he 
had his rental agreement and his license. He then told the 
3 
defendants that although they were free to go, he wanted to search 
their vehicle.2 Jesus said he would consent and Shields produced 
a written consent form which he had obtained from another Officer, 
Sergeant Kevin Olsen, and asked Jesus if he would sign it. Jesus 
inquired what would happen if he didn't sign the form and following 
conversation insued: 
Jesus: Where, if I don't sign there I can be free? 
Yes. 
You stop me further down the road? 
No, no I won't. 
Someone else will. 
I don't think so. 
(Couldn't hear) 
RO: 
Jesus: 
RO: 
Jesus: 
RO: 
Jesus: 
RO: Today's date is the 20th, that's the date I, have 
here, then I'll have the other officer sign. I 
seriously don't think (?) its' that bad. 
Jesus: You can see the truck, you can open and look at 
furniture. 
RO: Well, this is what I've ask you to do, to open it 
and look in there. I've ask you permission (?) 
This just says I've talked to you and asked to do 
that. (?) 
See Exhibit 1 at 2. 
After Jesus had signed the consent form, Shields motioned to 
the dog handler to join him at his location. Shields then 
proceeded to open the truck's back door and let the dog into the 
truck to conduct the search which resulted in the seizure of 
2A transcript of this conversation is attached as Exhibit 1, 
4 
sixteen (16) kilograms of cocaine which was secreted inside some of 
the furniture. 
ZZI. DZ8CU8QXQIX 
A. THE CONTINUED DETENTION OP THE BELTRANS TO HAVE THEM POST A 
BOND WAS A PRETEXT 
Defendants argue that Shields' actions of keeping Jesus 
Belt^an's driver's license and rental agreement, and escorting he 
and his nephew into Richfield to see the Magistrate, constituted a 
Pretext for his real purpose of searching the U-Haul. The Court 
agrees* 
In United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), 
the tJnited States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit delineated 
the correct standard to be applied when determining whether a stop 
or other police action constitutes a pretext. The court stated: 
A pretextual stop occurs when the police use a legal-
justification to make the stop in order to search a 
person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an 
unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the 
reasonable suspicion necessary t0 support a stop. The 
classic example, presented in this case, occurs when an 
officer stops a driver for a min^r traffic violation in 
order to investigate a hunch that the driver is engaged 
in illegal drug activity. 
Id* at 1515. 
The court continued by stating that: 
[A] court should ask 'not whether the officer could 
validly have made the stop, but whether under the same 
circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the 
stop in the absence of the invalid purpose.' . • . In 
other words, 'the proper basis of concern is not with why 
the officer deviated from the usu^i practice in this case 
but simply that he did deviate.' 
Id. at 1517 (emphasis original) (citations omitted). 
5 
In the present case, Shields testified that it was not his 
common practice to take out-of-state traffic offenders to a 
magistrate to post a bond. He further testified that at the time 
he escorted the Beltrans to Richfield, he didn't think he had 
sufficient probable cause to get a search warrant, but that he 
nonetheless called ahead to arrange for a canine drug team to meet 
him at the courthouse in Richfield. 
The government argued that Shields had sufficient 
justification for escorting the Beltrans to the Magistrate and that 
the stop was not pretextual. Shields testified that he escorted 
the Beltrans to the magistrate because Sevier County was not his 
normal patrol area and he did not have any mailing forms for the 
Sevier County Court. He further testified that Arturo had no 
picture identification and, therefore, that he could not adequately 
determine if Arturo was being truthful about his identity. The 
Court finds these arguments unpersuasive. 
The Court finds it incredible that the mere fact that Shields 
had no mailing slips for the Sevier County Court made it imperative 
that the Beltrans be taken to see the magistrate. The citations 
given to the Beltrans clearly indicated the address to which the 
fine should be sent and Shields had a record of Jesus' driver's 
license and his address in Colorado. Furthermore, Shields 
testified that he made no attempt to determine Arturo's identity 
upon arriving at the magistrate's office. Truly, if Arturo's lack 
of identification was a major factor in determining whether to let 
the Beltrans proceed on their trip or to take them to the 
6 
magistrate, Shields should have made further inquiry or taken 
further action regarding Arturo's identity. In any event, Shields 
did nnt- have sufficient reason to compel the defendants to appear 
before the magistrate at that time.3 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the trip to the 
Magistrate's office was pretextual. Shields created the pretext in 
order to allow the canine drug team sufficient time to get in place 
so that Shields might expedite his premeditated search. This 
pretextual detention set in motion a series of events which 
eventually led to the limited consent of Jesus Beltran to search 
his vehicle. Because the trip to the Magistrate was pretextual, 
the consent and scope of the consent demands serious scrutiny. 
3Section 41-6-166 of the Utah Code provides in pertinent part, 
(1) Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of 
this act punishable as a misdemeanor, the arrested 
person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the 
following cases, be taken without unnecessary delay 
before a magistrate within the county in which the 
offense charged is alleged to have been committed and who 
has jurisdiction of such offense and is nearest or most 
accessible with reference to the place where said arrest 
is made, in any of the following cases: 
* * * 
(d) In any other event when the person arrested 
refuses to give his written promise to appear in court as 
hereinafter provided, or when in the discretion of the 
arresting officer, a written promise to appear is 
insufficient. 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-166 (1988). 
There is no evidence in the record that Jesus or Arturo 
Beltran refused to sign the document promising to appear. 
Furthermore, for the reasons previously described, the Court finds 
that there was insufficient justification to believe that a written 
promise would be inadequate. 
7 
B. ESCORTING THE BEL TRANS TO THE MAGISTRATE WAS AH IMPERMISSIBLE 
DETENTION IN VIOLATION OF WALKER AND GUZMAN 
As stated above
 f the Court finds that the trip into the 
Magistrate's office was a pretext in order to allow the drug-sniff 
team to get into place* The Court further finds that the prolonged 
detention which resulted from the pretextual trip into Richfield 
was in direct violation of United States v, Walker. 751 F. Supp. 
199 (D. Utah 1990), vacated and remanded. 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 
1991), reh'q denied. 941 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1991) and United 
States v, Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). 
The lesson of both Guzman and Walker is that a detained driver 
who has produced proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle 
and who has a valid license should be given the citation for which 
he was detained and sent on his way "without being subject to 
further delay by police for additional questioning." Guzman. 864 
F.2d at 1519. In the case at bar, although Jesus had a valid 
Colorado driver's license and although he possessed a valid rental 
agreement, he and Arturo were detained and taken to the magistrate 
in hopes that after they had appeared before the magistrate, they 
might answer additional questions and consent to a search of their 
vehicle. As demonstrated below, Shields' own testimony supports 
this finding. 
Q. So in other words, right after you pulled out from that 
stop, you knew you were going to seek a consent to search, or 
— or were in some manner trying to effect a search of that 
truck, didn't you. 
A. Yes. 
8 
Shields' testimony that he did not have enough evidence for a 
warrant, coupled with the fact that when he detained the 
defendants, he knew he was going* to try to search the vehicle, 
comes within the classic definition of a pretext outlined in Guzman 
and cited in this opinion. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515. The violation 
of both Walker and Guzman provide further taint to the consent and 
require the Court to closely examine the circumstances surrounding 
the voluntary nature of the consent and its scope. 
C. THE CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER DOCTRINE 
The government argues that after Jesus and Arturo had paid 
their fines and were free to go, a detention situation no longer 
existed. Thus, when Shields asked to search the vehicle, the 
government contends, there was no violation of Guzman and Walker. 
Indeed, the government argues that Guzman and Walker are 
inapplicable. The Court does not agree. 
The government relies on the doctrine known as the 
police/citizen consensual encounter. Under this doctrine, if a 
detention situation does not exist, the police are free to ask for 
and receive consent to search a citizen's property even though the 
officer has no probable cause to believe he will find illegal or 
incriminating material.4 
Although it can be argued that after defendants received their 
property and paid their fines, a detention situation no longer 
4In arguing the police/citizen^ consensual encounter, the 
government relies predominantly on the Tenth Circuit cases of 
United States v. Werkinq. 915 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1990) and United 
States v. Peases. 918 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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existed, the court believes that there is something fundamentally 
different about the facts of this case and the facts of other cases 
involving consensual encounters. 
In United States v, Werkinq, 915 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1990), 
the Tenth Circuit held that a seizure of marijuana from the 
defendant's car did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the 
defendant gave consent to the search in the context of a consensual 
encounter. In distinguishing Werkinq from Guzman, the Tenth 
Circuit stated, 
Guzman is different from this case. Before Dyer 
asked Werking any further questions, he returned 
Werking's driver's license and registration papers and 
gave him the contact sheet. The officer in Guzman. 
however, did not return the defendant's license before 
questioning him. The defendant legally could not proceed 
on his way. He thus was seized within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment. In the present case, however, Werking 
was free to leave the scene. He chose to engage in a 
consensual encounter with Dyer. We hold that Werking's 
responses to Dyer's questions about transporting 
narcotics, firearms, or large sums of money were the 
voluntary cooperation of a private citizen with a law 
enforcement official and were not obtained in violation 
of the fourth amendment. 
Werkinq, 915 F.2d at 1409. 
Although the Beltrans' appearance before the magistrate and 
the payment of the tickets technically ended the detention 
situation, the Court believes that there is something fundamentally 
different about the police conduct in this case and the police 
conduct in Werkinq. In Werkinq. the officer and the defendant were 
out on the open road. The officer wrote out the ticket and gave it 
to Mr. Werking telling him he was free to go. At this point, he 
asked a series of questions that the Tenth Circuit held formed the 
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basis of the consensual encounter. In the case at bar the facts 
are dissimilar. 
After Shields had given the Beltrans their citations, he kept 
both the rental agreement and Jesus' license. He then escorted the 
Beltrans to the magistrates office knowing he had no probable cause 
for a search warrant and intending to search the vehicle by getting 
the owner's consent. The pretextual detention led the defendants 
to a location where Shields had arranged to meet the canine drug-
sniff team. Shield's sole purpose in taking the defendants before 
the magistrate was to detain them, get the team in place, obtain 
the defendants' consent, and search the vehicle. The Fourth 
Amendment provides citizens with a shield against overly intrusive 
action by law enforcement officials. A violation of a defendant's 
rights can not be remedied simply by telling them they are free to 
go and then asking for permission to search their property. 
Although the conversation between Jesus Beltran and Shields may 
technically be termed a consensual encounter, the only reason that 
Shields was able to engage in that encounter was because he had 
violated the defendants' rights in direct contravention of Guzman 
and Walker.s 
*The government also cites United States v. Peases, 918 F.2d 
118 (10th Cir. 1990), cert, denied. Peases v. United States, 111 
S.Ct. 2859 (1991) for the proposition that the consent obtained, 
and the search conducted by Trooper Shields was legal. The facts 
of Peases are similar to the facts of Werking. Peases was stopped 
for a traffic violation. After the officer gave him a ticket, 
returned his license, and told him he was free to go, he asked if 
he might search the Peases' car. Peases consented. The officer 
proceeded to search the car and seized one kilogram of cocaine. 
Like the facts in Werking, the Court finds that the facts of 
Peases are distinguishable for the reasons stated in the opinion. 
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D. CONSENT 
The Tenth Circuit has held that when the defendant consents to 
a search following a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights , "the 
consent is valid only if it is voluntary in fact, A determination 
whether a particular consent is voluntary in fact is made by 
examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
consent." Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1520 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has stated that if a 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated, the voluntariness 
of the confession must be "sufficiently an act of free will to 
purge the primary taint." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 
(1975) (quoting Wong Su v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 486 
(1963)) . 
After a careful examination of the totality of the 
circumstances, the Court finds that the Shields' disclosure 
concerning the nature and scope of the search was insufficient to 
allow Jesus to make a informed, voluntary decision as to whether to 
allow or disallow the search. Shields knew from the moment he 
asked the Beltrans to accompany him to Richfield that he wanted to 
search the truck for drugs. Indeed, he testified that he believed 
a dog-sniff team would be available to him because at that time he 
was engaging in a drug interdiction program called the Span 70 
Project. Acting on that belief, Shields had a canine drug-sniff 
dog waiting at the courthouse when the Beltrans arrived and called 
other officers in order to get the written consent form. Jesus, 
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however, knew nothing of the drug-sniff team and from his comments 
obviously did not understand the nature nor scope of Shields 
intended search. 
If Shields wanted proper and truly voluntary consent to search 
the truck, he should have informed the Beltrans as to the 
following: (1) The materials for which he was searching; (2) The 
method to be employed, i.e., use of a drug-sniff dog; (3) The scope 
of the search; and (4) The specific consequences that would result 
if illegal substances were found. Shields failed to inform the 
Beltrans in this manner and# therefore, the court finds that Jesus 
was not fully informed as to the nature of the and scope of the 
search. Consequently, Jesus' consent was not fully informed and 
not truly voluntary. 
E. SCOPE OF THE SEARCH 
The Tenth Circuit has held that "[tjhe scope of a consent 
search is limited by the breadth of the actual consent itself.11 
United States v. Gav, 774 F.2d 368# 377 (1985). In this case, the 
police transcript of the conversation regarding consent 
memorializes the intended scope of the search to which Jesus 
consented. Even assuming disclosure by Shields when specifying the 
scope of his purported consent, Jesus stated, w[y]ou can see the 
truck, you can open and look at furniture." See Exhibit 1 at 2. 
Shields then confirmed the scope of the search when he stated, 
"Well, this is what I've ask you to do, to open it and look in 
there. I've ask your permission (?) This just says I've talked to 
you and asked to do that. (?)" Id. 
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Even assuming disclosure by Shields, the scope of Jesus' 
consent was to allow the officers to open the truck and look at the 
furniture. Shields never informed the Jesus that he would be using 
drug-sniff dog. Nor is it clear that Jesus' consent would allow 
the officer to enter the truck or handle the furniture. The Court 
finds, therefore, that even assuming disclosure by Shields, the 
scope of the search was exceeded when drug-sniff dog entered the 
truck and conducted a search. Accordingly, this evidence, which 
was obtained in violation of the defendants' Fourth Amendment 
rights, must be suppressed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Shields' pretextual and unlawful detention of the Beltrans set 
in motion a series of events which led to the illegal search of the 
Beltrans' truck. Because Shields unlawfully detained the Beltrans 
in violation of Walker and Guzman, the defendants' Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated and, therefore, their consent would be valid 
only if voluntary in fact. Looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, the Court finds that the defendants' consent was 
neither informed nor voluntary. The Court also finds that the 
officer exceeded the scope of the involuntary search and, 
therefore, that the evidence obtained as a result must be 
suppressed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated, this 30th day of^January, 1992. 
rutse* S. Jenkins* Chief Judge 
United State/ District Court 
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EXHIBIT 1 
/Z3 
November 20, 1991 - Conversation between Trooper C. Dean Shields, 
(RO) and Jesus Humbero Beltran (Jesus) 
RO: I will be looking for contraband or other illegal items. 
If we do find those items we will be seizing them and 
taking other action. At this point you are free to go. 
I'd like to look inside your van though. I'd like to 
receive a consent to search on your vehicle. Will you 
consent to that search? 
Jesus: Yes. 
RO: Let me have you sign right here. Put your middle 
name•••• 
Jesus: Humbero 
RO: And Beltran and where you reside at—the address on the 
citation. Do you reside at 333 Lincoln? 
Jesus: No, 340 So 
RO: What's that? 
Jesus: 340 South Clay, that's Denver 
RO: In Denver, Colorado? 
Jesus: Yes. 
RO: Do you have a telephone number there? 
Jesus: Yes, Sir, 922-5169 
RO: 922 What? 
Jesus: 922-5169 
RO: I'm Trooper Shields 
Jesus: Who? 
RO: I'm Trooper Shields and I may have other officers 
assisting in the search here, Ah, in the U-Haul truck 
that you rented, your the only one on the rental contract 
there. What model is that F-350? 
Olson: 350. 
RO: (Couldn't hear tape) 
I authorize said officer!s) to remove from my vehicle, 
residence, and/or other property any documents or items 
deemed pertinent to any investigation, with the 
Page 2 
understanding that the officer will furnish a receipt for 
whatever is removed. 
I am giving this written permission to these officers 
freely and voluntarily, without any threats or promises. 
If you agree with that, let me have you sign right there. 
Jesus: Where, if I don't sign there I can be free? 
RO: Yes. 
Jesus: You stop me further down the road? 
RO: No, no I won't. 
Jesus: Someone else will. 
RO: I don't think so. 
Jesus: (Couldn't hear) 
RO: Today's date is the 20th, that's the date I have here, 
then I'll have the other officer sign. I seriously don't 
think (?) it's that bad. 
Jesus: You can see the truck, you can open and look at 
furniture. 
RO: Well, this is what I've ask you to do, to open it and 
look in there. I've ask your permission (?) This just 
says I've talked to you and asked to do that. (?) 
Jesus: Is it 9:22? 
RO: It's 9:20. 
Conversation between Sergeant Kevin Olson (Olson) Arturo Beltran 
(Arturo) 
Olson: 
Arturo: 
Olson: 
Arturo: 
Olson: 
and Jesus Beltran (Jesus) 
Where you guys headed to? 
Denver 
Where do you live, Denver? 
California 
You live in California. Are you moving to Denver? 
